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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to perform a cross-country survey of the level 
of integration of systems of financial cooperatives (FC) and its effect on measures of 
performance. We develop a classification scheme based on a theoretical framework 
that builds on published work using transaction cost economics (TCE) to explain 
integration of large numbers of financial cooperatives into networks. We identify three 
critical level of increasing integration we call respectively atomized systems, 
consensual networks and strategic networks. Further, we test some of the 
propositions that result from the theoretical framework on an international sample of 
financial cooperative systems. Based on this analysis we can conclude that : i) 
Integration is less (more) important is developing (more developed) countries and for 
very small (large) financial cooperatives as a determinant of efficiency. However, 
integration tends to reduce volatility of efficiency and performance regardless of 
development.  ii) Integration appears to help control measure of managers’ expense 
preferences that tend to affect performance of FC. iii) Despite high costs of running 
hub-like organizations in highly integrated system, these systems economize in 
bounded rationality and operate at lower costs that less integrated systems. 
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Résumé: L’objectif de cet article est de comparer le niveau d’intégration de systèmes 
de coopératives financières opérant dans plusieurs pays et d’évaluer l’impact de 
cette intégration sur les mesures de performance. Nous développons une 
classification basée sur un cadre théorique utilisant le concept  économique des 
coûts de transaction pour expliquer l’intégration d’un grand nombre de coopératives 
financières en réseau. Nous identifions trois niveaux d’intégration que nous appelons 
respectivement les systèmes atomisés, les réseaux consensuels, et les réseaux 
stratégiques. De plus, nous testons quelques-unes des propositions issues du cadre 
théorique sur un échantillon international de systèmes de coopératives financières. 
Selon cette analyse, nous concluons que : i) L’intégration est moins (plus) importante 
dans les pays en développement (industrialisés) et pour les très petites (grandes) 
coopératives financières comme déterminant d’efficacité. Cependant, l’intégration 
tends à réduire la volatilité de l’efficacité et de la performance, peu importe le niveau 
de développement du pays. ii) L’intégration semble améliorer la gouvernance des 
coopératives financières, notamment en contrôlant de façon plus stricte la préférence 
pour la dépense des dirigeants, ce qui en améliore la performance financière. iii) Il 
semble que les coûts élevés qu’implique l’organisation en un réseau intégré sont 
plus que compensés par les économies réalisées grâce à une gouvernance plus 
stricte. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction
In some countries the highest Corinthian cornices do not belong to a venerable capitalist banking
institution, but to a just as venerable but less revered, cooperative banking institution. The halls
and offices of those giants are not designed to welcome business executives performing M&A or
"red carpet" private banking operations, but for the common man (butcher, carpenter, teacher or
peasant), with just a few dollars in the account. But there are millions of them, and together they
have assembled the largest banking institution in the country. Networks of mutual financial inter-
mediaries have become the, or one of the, primary financial institution include Austria (Raiffeisen
and Volkbanks), Brazil (SiCoob and Sicredi), Finland (Okobank), France (Crédit Agricole, Crédit
Mutuel and Banques Populaires), Germany (Raiffeisen), Italy (Banchi de Credito Cooperativo);
Japan (Shinkin Bank), Korea (National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, NACF; National
Credit Union Federation of Korea , NACUFOK, and the Korean Federation of Community Credit
Cooperatives, KFCC), Netherlands (Rabobank), Quebec (Canada, Desjardins) and Switzerland
(Raiffeisen). Many other less dramatic but remarkable examples exist. Since their mission is to
serve local common folks, rarely engaging in international operations, they are unknown abroad.
In Germany, Sparkassen (community banks) and FC together control nearly 60% of the country’s
financial assets and serve 70 million clients, or 87% of the population. In Quebec, the market
share is over 40% in terms of assets with 5.2 million members out of a population of 7.5 million.
In the Netherlands Rabobank, in France Crédit Agricole, Crédit Populaire and Credit Mutuel, in
Finland the Okobank Group, in Austria’s Volks- and Raiffeisen banks, in Italy Banche di Credito
Cooperativo and Banche Popolari controlled in 2002 a market share in term of assets of 40, 39, 33,
32, and 29 percent, of the financial sector respectively (DG-Verlag [2000]). In other countries, how-
ever, FC play a small or marginal role in the economy, with only a minor share of financial assets.
Often, relative size of the system appears to be related to the level of integration But differences
in integration do not appear to cut randomly across countries and regions.1 As income increases,
more advanced integration becomes frequent but not universal.
What explains differences in the level of integration of these systems, and what are the con-
sequences in terms of macro —system wide—and micro—institution level—performance? Even more
fundamentally, why do FC create these sometimes highly complex structures? In an earlier work
Desrochers and Fischer [2003] (D&F) proposed a theoretical framework that provides an explana-
tion to some of these observations. In particular, D&F’s model generates hypotheses on why FC
integrate into networks, what are some of the factors that explain differences in their organizational
complexity and the impact they may have on performance of member institutions. They test some
hypotheses derived from the model using data for two FC systems (United States’ credit unions
and Quebec’s caisses populaires) operating in societies with similar development but where integra-
tion differs markedly. In another paper Desrochers, Fischer and Gueyie [2004] (DF&G) performs a
similar comparison of Quebec and Ontario FC systems. However, both these tests, while indicative
and supportive of the model’s predictions, are limited by two fact: first, they cannot separate the
country effect (related to regulation, tradition, etc.) from the effect of network organization; second,
and more importantly, they cannot test the prediction that the level of development of financial
markets influences the level of complexity of networks required to face contractual risk. To over-
come these limitations requires a sample with specific characteristics: i) it must be multinational
and preferably in panel to control for country specific factors and separate country and integration
effects; ii) it must cover economies that differ with respect to financial sector development to assess
1Under ”integration” we understand the affiliation of FC into more or less closely bound organizational struc-
tures that serve to provide members with a wide variety of services including representation, private ordering, meta
coordination, management of infrastructure and as custodian of joint investments in service-producing affiliates.
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the link between this and networking needs; iii) it must present data for individual institutions to
assess the impact of integration on individual FC performance. We set out to build that database
and present the results of the analysis here.
The answers obtained from this research are of interest to three constituencies. Leaders of FC
systems, for whom the link between performance and integration has long term planning implica-
tions. Regulators, facing the task of creating a regulatory framework that encourages stability in
the financial system and who will be able to assess the link between regulation and the organization
of the FC system, and, in turn, with performance. Supervisors, whose role is to limit the likelihood
of low performance events that may put savings by consumers —particularly poor ones— at risk,
will be able to learn the type of organizational environment that promotes stability within the FC
system.
The paper consists of two parts. The first, classifies systems of FC around the world based
on key features that suggest qualitative jumps in the complexity of inter-FC contractual relations,
using a transaction cost economics (TCE) framework. We use a small set of networks features
to differentiate them into three categories which we call atomized systems (AS, very low level of
integration), consensual networks (CN, medium level of integration) and strategic networks (SN,
high levels of integration). The second part presents an empirical study based on 23 systems of
FC, in which we test some of the hypotheses that result from D&F’s theoretical framework.
2 Classification of systems
As a first step we develop a set of criteria that may be used to assign the 23 systems into categories.2
We base our taxonomy on the theory proposed by D&F with extensions by DF&G that explains
integration of large numbers of FC into networks. The central proposition in D&F is that the level
of macro-organization of systems of FC is the result of the risks associated with the procurement
of inputs necessary to perform the function of financial intermediation. This risk encourages the
formation of inter-FC collectives to pool input procurement. The resulting inter-FC collective may
be short term (spot) repeated contracts, long term alliances (hybrid relations) or may lead to the
merger of FC (hierarchies). Which form of collective they adopt depends on the level of contractual
hazard inherent in the relation and the governance cost of the collaboration. Hybrid relation, in the
form of networks, is a superior form of governance, over spot relations and mergers, for relatively
wide and relevant —but not all—ranges of contractual hazard. We now present a description an
outline of this theory emphasizing key features that are relevant to articulate the classification
scheme. For details of the theory see D&F.
2.1 A review of the TCE based theory of cooperative networks
The contractual relations on which the model focuses is the one established between FC (horizontal)
to jointly procure a designated segment of inputs or pool investments to produce those inputs. The
span of inputs covered by the resulting collective is the designated segment. This focus on horizon-
tal relations contrasts with the analysis of buy vs. make, usually performed in the context of TCE,
where researchers stress the contract between suppliers and buyers (vertical). The lateral contract
arises from a pure production-economics imperative, when FC join forces to exploit economies of
scale and reduce uncertainty in the procurement of inputs needed in the intermediation process.
2An alternative approach is to develop an index of integration that can be used as explanatory variable. We never
considered such an approach since it is in inconsistent with the theoretical tools used as the framework of analysis.
This will be made explicit shortly.
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However, lateral contracts between partners to form a "shared supply alliance" imply appropriabil-
ity hazard (AH) for the members of the alliance. AH results when counterparts act opportunistically
to appropriate the rent generated by the alliance. This hazard is not particular to FC. It arises in
any inter-firm alliances that involve technology transfers and joint production of goods and services
in the presence of weak property rights (Burr [2003], Hagedoorn [1993], Oxley [1997]). AH ”can be
traced to difficulties in adequately specifying payoff-relevant activities, monitoring the execution of
prescribed activities, and/or enforcing contracts through the courts" (Oxley [1997]: 389). As the
span of the designated segment subject to joint production/procurement increases and technology
involved in their production becomes more complex, FC increase their mutual dependence. With it,
increases the amount of resources invested in developing the capacity to produce those services, and
the risks of their loss. With AH increases the need to introduce cooperative adaptation mechanisms
and the range of hierarchical features proposed in the literature of joint ventures and alliances.3
D&F also propose that in the case of FC, expense preferences (EP), one type of organizational
costs, play a key role increasing significantly the slope of the efficient frontier. This reduces the
range over which mergers are the cost minimizing alternative. Managers are not neutral when it
comes to the allocation of resources into different inputs used by the firm they control. They display
bounded rationality and opportunist behavior, and as such are likely to engage in sub-goal pursuit if
given the opportunity. Sub-goal pursuit increases with diffusion of ownership (Nicols [1967], Marks
[2000]) which raises managerial discretion and, in the case of cooperative institutions, is positively
correlated with the size of the institution. This is due to the cooperative principle of one-member
one-vote and the free riding of monitoring phenomenon. Thus, Downs [1957] ”Law of Diminishing
Control” has a larger impact in mutual organizations. Ceteris paribus, larger mutual institutions
can be expected to display increasing deviations from the cost minimizing optimum. The role of
EP in the context of mutual financial intermediaries has found unambiguous support in empirical
studies across very different economic contexts (e.g. Benin: Gueyie, Sinzogan and Solé [2005];
Bolivia and Peru: ?; Colombia: Barona, Caicedo and Zuluaga [2005]; Philippines: Desrochers and
Lamberte [2005]; United States: Gropper and Hudson [2003], Gropper and Beard [1995], Akella
and Greenbaum [1988], among others). Recently, evidence was found that the wave of mergers and
rapid growth in size in the United States credit union system that followed the 1982 elimination
of multiple bond restriction, is resulting in measurable increase in "agency costs" Leggett and
Strand [2001]–-a parallel concept proposed by Jensen and Meckling [1976] that describes manager-
owner relations from a different theoretical perspective. The effect was also found in the United
States Savings and Loans sector ( Mester [1991], Mester [1989], Verbrugge and Goldstein [1981],
Verbrugge and Jahera [1981]), in other industries (Oswald and Gardiner [1994], Awh and Primeaux
[1985], Rhoades [1980]) and in mutual property liability insurance firms (Cummins, Weiss and Zi
[1999]). Further, there is an extensive empirical literature of the role of ”agency conflicts” in firm
performance.
As the span and complexity of the designated segment increases, so does AH. Thus FC must
decide among three choices: i) remain tied up in spot contractual relations increasingly unsuitable
3As noted Gulati and Singh [1998], when firms anticipate appropriation concerns, they are likely to organize al-
liances with more hierarchical contracts. According to Stinchcombe [1985] business alliances may create a number
of hierarchical features including: i) a command structure and authority system; ii) incentive systems; iii) standard
operating procedures and control mechanisms; iv) dispute resolution procedures and mechanisms (that is, private
ordering mechanisms that bypass courts and markets); and v) a non-market pricing system. The literature also
suggests that inter-firm alliances build governance structures to manage anticipated coordination costs —in TCE ter-
minology, cooperative adaptation mechanisms—and to address appropriation concerns. Likewise, it has been proposed
(García Canal, Lianeza and Arino [2003]) that the need of introducing formal control mechanisms to manage an al-
liance increases when it involves multiple parties, clearly the case of FC networks. For a systematic treatment of the
problem of building alliances see Zentes, Swoboda and Morschett [2003].
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for the long-term nature of the collaboration; ii) engage in alliances which enhance procurement
costs reduction effects but require organizational structures to control AH, but where the exercise
of EP is limited by the size of the institutions and by organizational mechanisms that limit man-
agerial discretion; or iii) engage into merger with partners, suitable for higher levels of AH, thus
internalizing contractual relations but where EP hazard associated with the dilution of ownership
is high. Accentuated governance costs associated with mergers due to EP in turn implies that hy-
brids —networks— will be the governance mechanism of choice over a wide range of levels of AH—the
”swollen middle” Hennart [1993].
The extension by DF&G replicates the reasoning that explains the existence of U-form and M-
form organizations.4 It proposes that networks may take different forms. They distinguish between
highly integrated strategic networks (SN) and more loosely structured consensual networks (CN).5
CN operate on the basis of continued consensus of all or a subset of participants of the collective.
Members of the collective remain free to opt out from the use of network services. The key difference
is that in SN the traditional apex of cooperative federations becomes a ”hub node” with a function
of strategic leadership. The hub is thus endowed with strategic planning and decision management
for the entire network (absent in CN) over at least some relevant domain of input procurement.
A representation governance structure (usually the General Assembly and the Board of Directors)
performs decision control in representation of independent member FC. The individual first-tier
nodes retain operations management and control for the unit and over all strategic issues that fall
outside of the hub’s competence. Thus, a separation between operational and strategic decision
management and control develops for at least some relevant domain of activities in the network.
Based on TCE arguments, DF&G conjecture that SN are created to control AH when the scope of
the collaboration, realized or desired, demands higher level of coordination between and control of
partners.6 The hub is thus empowered to perform this coordination and control function. Thus,
with AH, the organizational kernel expands as the network adds cooperative adaptation mechanisms
consisting of the range of hierarchical features proposed in the joint-ventures literature noted before
(footnote 3). Maladaptation within the network is reduced by standardizing operations, establishing
common strategic plans across the relevant domain of activities and introducing private ordering
mechanisms to insure party compliance and credible checks against opportunism over the activities
in which AH is most relevant. The trade-off between the nuisance of giving up control for strategic
decision over the designated segment on one side, and the benefit of expanded pooling of input
procurement and control of the resulting AH in the network on the other, favors the second. In
4M-form organizations are created for the purpose of economizing on bounded rationality and to attenuate subgoal
pursuit by managers. The issue of M-form and U-from organizations has been covered in the industrial organization
literature (e.g. Ingham [1992], Armour and Teece [1978], Steer and Cable [1978] and Williamson [1975]).
5This follows the terminology proposed Greve [2002], Polster [2001] and Bonus, Greve, Kring and Polster [1999].
SN are interpreted in the sense of Jarrillo [1988], Jarrillo [1993] and Sydow [1992] Other classifications of networks
with different names but similar content exist: e.g. hierarchical (for strategic) vs. heterarchical (for consensual)
networks (Windeler [2003]: 49-50).
6This statement may contradict the intuition of observers of FC systems that perceive strongly integrated
networks—along the lines described in this paragraph— as pyramids with a powerful top and powerless FC at the
base, "not much different from a bank with branches." While this may exceptionally be the case, it is not the norm.
A well designed alliance representation governance structure—and most SN have one— will protect the property rights
of members in individual FC from opportunistic behavior by both, other members of the collective and management
at the hub. The span of activities over which the hub has responsibility and authority is, after all, decided upon by
the representation governance bodies with decision control power, and can be revoked, limited or expanded anytime
by the same within the rules established by statutes of the network, which, in turn are decided upon by the general
assembly. In fact, we argue that the property rights of members of a FC that belongs to a network are better pro-
tected from the ravages of entrenched management than in large FC that result from the merger of several FC as is
increasingly common in, say, the North American context.
4
turn, better control of AH creates safe conditions for enlarged further pooling of input procurement
and valuable investments that allow the network to expand the range and quality of financial services
they offer to members.7 Network members define the domain for the hub’s strategic management
and control powers according to the particularities of the market and the span of the designated
segment. Thus it varies from one system of FC to another, although it coincides over wide ranges
due to similarities of financial products offered internationally.
2.2 Impact on individual FC performance
The theoretical framework summarized above has empirical implications for individual FC perfor-
mance. This is of interest for regulators and supervisors whose role is to limit the likelihood of
low performance events that may put savings by consumers at risk. It is know that in M-form
organization the separation of functions between the head-office and divisions has the effect of
both: i) economizing on bounded rationality (specializes the function of strategic and operational
planning), and ii) limits sub-goal pursuit (as both levels control each other in the performance of
their respective functions).8
SN have the same effect on FC systems: economize on bounded rationality and limit sub goal
pursuit. By separating strategic from operational planning and decision making, strategic networks
economize on bounded rationality. Paraphrasing Chandler (cited in Williamson, 1996, pp. 82) the
M-form ”clearly removed the executive responsible for the destiny of the entire enterprise from the
more routine operational activity, and so gave them the time, information, and even psychological
commitment for long-term planning and appraisal”. In the case of FC, as the complexity of the
market and the diversity of financial products and services required by member-clients increases,
bounded rationality by managers limits their capacity to make informed decisions at both strategic
and operational levels.9 The relatively small size of (most) FC prevents establishing local capacity
to perform the evaluation and planning function required to accomplish this competently. Thus,
local managers of nodes may find it useful to pool resources with other nodes and create the capacity
in the apex to perform this complex function. Managers at the hub thus can focus on the network’s
strategic issues while not being occupied by operational aspect of FC management which become
the exclusive competence of local managers. It is in this sense that SN economize on bounded
rationality.
The second aspect, attenuation of sub-goal pursuit is, perhaps even more important. In our
context, sub-goal pursuit translates into suboptimal allocation of resources. The separation of func-
tion of first-tier nodes (focus on operational decisions) and apex (focus on strategic goal planning
and control) managers, reduces the difficulty of assessing and controlling sub-goal pursuit at both
levels. It is not surprising that an almost universal feature of SN is the presence of a private ordering
mechanism (a network supervising body) that monitors compliance of members to key prudential
and strategic standards established for the network. Thus, management at first-tier nodes is now
supervised both by members-shareholders and the network’s private ordering mechanism. Simulta-
7One of the visible features of SN is the wide range of financial services offered, and that it is uniform for all
members of the collective regardless of their size or (rural) location. The range of services offered by FC of AS
and CN to its members, on the other hand, typically varies considerably and is positively related to the size of the
institution.
8This proposition counts with a solid empirical support. Examples are Ingham [1992], Armour and Teece [1978]
and Steer and Cable [1978].
9This is not just theory. As an example of this take the dilemma facing the FC system of Peru. There, Cajas
Municipales (municipal savings banks, modeled after the German Sparkassen) have been advancing aggressively into
the territory of FC. These, due to lack of centralized planning and strategic management, have thus far failed to
present a unified strategy to counter the loss of market share to the Cajas.
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neously, the decision control bodies (e.g. the network’s General Assembly and Board of Directors)
apply checks to prevent opportunism by management at the hub. A narrowly defined strategic
responsibility for the hub facilitates performance control (compared to that of a large FC where
managers assume both strategic and operational management responsibilities).
Economizing in bounded rationality and limiting sub-goal pursuit should have double effect:
i) reduce the variance of individual first-tier node performance measures; ii) reduce the cost of
running the combined bureaucracy at the level of the individual FC and the hub. The latter
is, likely, one of the most controversial hypothesis that derive from this analysis and one worth
of further analysis...and testing. Yet, it is a direct consequence of the organizational features of
SN which accomplishes: pooling strategic management facilities, improves efficiency and scope in
pooling input procurement and maintains opportunism in check at both levels of the organization.10
2.3 A taxonomy of FC networks
An important goal of this research is to design a FC system taxonomy that allows meaningful
comparisons across systems. This classification must link predictions obtained from the theoretical
analysis with institutional features observed in practice. The problem is that key features are usually
hidden. No system calls its apex a ”hub” as it became a SN, or calls itself ”strategic”, and no system,
consensual or strategic, offers to the public a list of items included in what we called the designated
segment of joint production or contracting, or the domain over which decision management and
control has been ceded to the hub. In practice, most apex call themselves federations, leagues or
associations and at best provide a list of services they offer to their member institutions. Thus
the challenge is to pick easily observable institutional features but that are meaningful to assign
systems to categories. Particularly important is to identify key observable institutional features
that represent qualitative jumps in the nature of the integration process and for which we have a
theoretical backing. Only by paying attention to the small print, or through direct interrogation of
authorities in the respective systems, were we able to raise the fine details needed.
2.3.1 The categories and classification criteria
The theoretical framework justifies a scheme with four categories: atomized systems (no or very
low integration); consensual networks (medium level of integration), strategic networks (high level
of integration) and mergers into a single (or just a few major) FC or cooperative bank. The
fourth category has no representation in reality thus it is ignored.11 The three levels we use are
10 Interestingly, D&F find that the intermediation margin of Quebec caisses popularies (that include the cost of
running the hub) is smaller than of equivalent sized United States credit unions that do not have to support the load
of a similar hub, while the range of services offered by all caisses compares favorably with those offered only by the
largest credit union.
11Some readers may object to this statement. We provide three plausible counter-examples that turn out no to be.
The first one is the Cooperative Bank (CB) of the UK. This institution —like the Cooperative Insurance Society (CIS)—
is not the result of a merger of individual FC in the search of economies of scale and an optimal lateral contracting
mechanism. Rather, it is a bank owned by the Cooperative Group created for the purpose of serving (with financial
products) members of the consumer (i.e. non-financial) co-operatives. Affiliation to the CB is not separate of that
in the Co-operative Group. The CB does, however, provide financial and other services to UK Credit Unions with
some apex functions. The second is Rabobank of Netherlands. Rabobank, despite its image of consolidated bank, is
not. Its image as unique bank is a marketing strategy adopted after the ”merger” of the two federations (Raiffeisen
and Boerelenbank) into a single federation, thus a network. The third is Okobank of Finland. This is a joint stock
company owned by the network of FC (used to provide banking services to the FC members of the network and to
service customers in territories not covered by the network itself), thus not the result of a merger of individual FC.
We are not saying that there are no mergers in the FC sector. Indeed there are plenty of mergers that have taken
place in most FC systems in the world, particularly in the last 10 years and in CN countries. One often finds—specially
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consistent with the theoretical framework outlined above. We proceed as follows. First we provide
definitions of each of the categories that are consistent with the theoretical framework but that
reflect observable institutional features. We use 10 features typically present in networks. Of
these 10 features, two are particularly important on theoretical grounds: pooling of resources and
separation of strategic and operational management and control. They will become benchmarks in
the classification system. Second, we identify for each system the extent to which each of the 10
institutional features are present. Based on this roster we then assign each of the 23 systems into
one of the three categories. Now the details.
We define each of the three categories as follows:
• Atomized systems (AS). Consist of collectives of FC with little or no formal ties that bind their
operations with no meta-coordination in the procurement of inputs and practically no pooling
of resources. As a result, no mutual lateral dependency exists. Autonomous adaptation to
consequential disturbances dominates, with each FC responding according to own incentives
and possibilities. Inter-FC transactions (if any) tend to be repeated but transient rather than
lasting. Relation are supported by classical contracts. It represent the lowest level in the
market-hybrid-hierarchy schema. However, following well-established cooperative tradition
—and institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powsell [1983]— even an AS will present an
apex that performs some activities. They include representation, cooperative education and
advisory services on management and prudential issues. It is, in fact, unusual that a FC
system does not at least present an association with a representation function.12 However,
these are functions that represent low inter-FC AH. All three are functions that involve no
significant investment and their value for opportunist behavior by members of the alliance is
low. In consequence the organizational kernel is minimal with almost no features designed
to perform cooperative adaptation.13 We classified a system as AS by exclusion if it didn’t
present the key feature of pooling of resources or some degree of standardization.14
• Consensual network (CN): Consist predominantly of collections of multilateral agreements
between first-tier nodes with a designated segment of voluntary joint input production or
contracting. The agreement is driven by the economic rationale of seeking economies of scale
and the reduction of uncertainty in the procurement of inputs. These relation are supported
by neoclassical contracts. The apex expands its role to become custodian of the resources
pooled by members of the network. A CN may have the function —in addition to those
described for the atomized systems— such as: the setting up of market sharing rules between
first-tier nodes; specify separation of responsibilities between the first and second tier nodes
(principle of subsidiarity); work towards the introduction of a unique image of trademark
that will distinguish the network. It may also start to delegate some of the strategic planning
under the AS and CN—some very large individual FC that are the result of radial growth and/or mergers. However
we contend that there exist no major cooperative banks resulting from the large scale mergers that has resulted in a
single (or a few) institutions. Even when some very large FC are observable (e.g. VanCity Credit Union of British
Columbia, Canada), they are accompanied by a large number of smaller FC that operate as a CN or have no link
among them (AS).
12Exceptions in our sample are Philippines’ cooperative rural banks, the later being even deprived of any represen-
tation apex structure.
13We define the organizational kernel as the minimal set of institutional features required to accomplish the objec-
tives set for the network.
14Pooling of resources represents an important qualitative jump since it creates conditions for opportunistic behavior
by members as some may manipulate appropriation of benefits related to the joint investments. Standardization
represents both a pooling of resources and an effort by the alliance to introduce private ordering mechanisms, by
allowing comparison of inter-FC behavior and performance.
7
function towards the central node. However, strategic decision control and management is
explicitly excluded. These networks operate on the basis of continued consensus of all nodes:
members of the collective remain free to opt out from the use of network services.15 This
implies that strategic decision making remain under control of first-tier nodes for a significant
domain of operations, and may conflict over that domain with the collective. Reciprocity and
hostage taking (Jarrillo [1993], pp. 136f) is the dominant mechanism for contract enforcement.
The organizational kernel is more complex than in AS but remains relatively simple.
• Strategic network (SN): As CN, they consist predominantly of collections of multilateral agree-
ments between first-tier nodes with a designated segment of joint input procurement/production.
The apex is custodian of the resources pooled by members and network-wide strategic deci-
sion management over the designated segment is transferred from management at the first-tier
nodes to management at the apex, and decision control is shifted from the first-tier gover-
nance bodies to the network wide governance bodies. Decisions taken by the collective over
the specified domain, according to defined governance mechanisms, become mandatory for
the entire collective. The apex becomes a ”hub node” (Greve [2005], Greve [2002], Polster
[2001], Bonus, Greve, Kring and Polster [1999], Jarrillo [1988]) with power of decision control
and management in representation of the collective (with or without ”vote” by the collective).
Relation are supported by neoclassical contracts. The separation of strategic and operational
management and control implies that first-tier nodes consent to adhere to strategic decision
made by the collective including some or all of the following: the mandatory use of network
services, use of standard procedures and systems, control of key variables (such as rates on
deposits and loans), unique brand name and marketing strategies and dispute resolution mech-
anisms.16 The network will have established a private ordering mechanism and a contingency
fund used to compensate members of failed institutions or finance restructuring plans. SN
present features that are specific to hierarchies and that provide an additional effectiveness to
operate in highly competitive environments (Bonus, Greve, Kring and Polster [1999], Greve
[2002]). Regulation is the dominant mechanism for contract enforcement. The organizational
kernel is complex.
======================
Please insert Table I here
======================
We present our schema and a short explanation of each of the 10 features in Figure 1 and in
Table I, respectively . The list of Table I does not cover all activities a network may perform but
15The United States credit union movement is an excellent example. One of the service organizations created by
the movement is the CUNA Mutual Group. The CUNA Mutual Group is the leading provider of financial services, on
a voluntary basis, to credit unions and their members, offering lending, protection, financial, employee and member
solutions through strategic partnerships, technological innovations and multiple service channels. Further, CUNA
Mutual Group is owned by a group of credit unions. Thus, individual credit unions that are not co-owners of CUNA
Mutual Group have no incentives to procure services from it and instead seek to maximize their individual benefit
scanning the market for the most competitive offer of the service, encouraging autonomous rather than cooperative
adaptation strategies.
16From a practical point of view, we found that the mandatory use of some network services is a key feature, easily
observable, that allows us to pinpoint the presence of a SN. Usually, a short exchange with a functionary of the
movement or a cognizant resource person allowed us to establish this. The move is likely to be motivated because
resources pooling necessary for the provision of that designated segment has become important and opportunistic or
divergent behavior—or plain bad management— by a member may cause losses to other or all members of the alliance.
Clearly, if a FC member of a network is not free to opt out of the use of the service, decisions over this particular
domain have been transferred to the hub. Any modification about the provision and use of this service will henceforth
not lie with the member but with the collective, unless the member decides to abandon the alliance.
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Figure 1:
we consider those we use to be key functions that are observable with relative ease. The schema is
simple, the main difficulty is to assess to what extent each of the 10 features are present in the 23
systems under study. In Figure 1 we present features in circles, larger circles are inclusive of smaller
ones. We classified systems without features included in the medium circle as AS; systems that
present any feature in the middle circle but none of those in the large circle as CN; and systems
with features in the large circle as SN. This is less arbitrary than it sounds. Network functions do
not appear randomly and there is a clear economic logic to the accumulation of functions. Once
a function appears it is likely that several do simultaneously.17 There is, for example, no network
in which there is a clear separation of strategic and operational management and control (large
circle) without substantial common investments, market sharing arrangements and most likely a
standardized image (medium circle) as well as representation and advisory services (small circle).
On the other hand, it does not make sense to separate strategic and operational planning (or
introduce prudential supervision or contractual solidarity) if there is no common investment and
pooling of resources that increases AH to justify the introduction of such advanced and expensive
governance mechanisms.
2.3.2 The classification exercise
We present the result of this classification exercise and the presence or absence of the key 10 features
in each system in Table II. This table is essentially a matrix of Boolean (0/1) values with respect
to the features in question.
======================
Please insert Table II here
17E.g., once an important pooling of resources is accomplished, it is likely that the feasibility of the venture
depends on a commitment of all members to acquire the inputs generated through this investment. This in itself
implies a transfer of decision power to the apex (which now becomes a hub). Further, it is likely that along with
this commitment networks will add private ordering mechanisms to monitor performance and delivery of services by
members. From there to include contractual solidarity mechanisms, such as a contingency fund, is a minor step. This
yields a full fledged SN.
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In the process of preparing this table we completed a system by system analysis of the key
institutional features. That is, we interrogated the sources of information available to us, to what
extent each of the 10 features was present in a system. In the process of completing this interro-
gation, we assembled a system by system description available from the authors. We classified as
atomized the following systems: in the OECD group, the U.K. Credit Unions that do not belong to
the ABCUL system, and among non-OECD Bolivia, Colombia and Philippines (cooperative rural
banks). We classified as CN, among OECD countries Japan Credit Unions, Ontario and United
States Credit Union systems, the Italian Banche Popolari, the Spanish FC and the UK ABCUL
systems and among non-OECD countries the FC systems of Benin, Lituania, Mali and Peru. Fi-
nally, among OECD countries, we classified as SN Germany’s Raiffeisen, Japan’s Shinkin Banks,
ILCU’s credit unions (Ireland) and Quebec caisses populaires Desjardins, and among non-OECD
countries Madagascar, Senegal and Uruguay.18
3 Data
We required three types of data to accomplish this research: i) the institutional data that would
allow us to classify the systems, ii) the individual FC-level financial data necessary to compute
efficiency scores and performance ratios; iii) macroeconomic and social variables used as proxies of
AH and to describe the level of development of the countries in the sample.
3.1 Institutional data
There are two main sources for our institutional data. Documentary and direct interview. Our
source of documentary information was predominantly the Internet, where we obtained information
about the systems based on published research in the form of articles and working papers and in
web-sites created by the institutions themselves. Documentary sources were used extensively for
most of the OECD country based systems. The second source was interviews. Our access to
Development International Desjardins (DID) officers with detailed information about systems with
which they have a working relation, allowed us to obtain unpublished institutional information
about several non-OECD country based systems. Our personal experiences working with some of
Latin America’s systems allowed us to complete the institutional information for these systems.
3.2 Financial data
Individual FC financial data was obtained from variety of sources:19 i) Bankscope was the source for
FC systems of Germany, Italy and Japan; ii) United States credit union data was obtained from the
web-site of the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA); iii) Desjardins caisses populaires
system data was obtained from the Desjardins federation; iv) Spanish FC system data was obtained
18Madagascar is definitively a problem case. A consistent use of our criteria led us to classify it as a SN, a ranking
that would surprise many, even us. However, the institutional details, in particular the presence of a mandatory use
of a designated segment of apex generated services—although this might be an almost empty set— leaves us no room.
19The collection of this complex data set was possible thanks to the intervention of several institutions and persons,
including: DICO of Ontario, FENACREP of Peru, DID (with several country data), Desjardins, Superintendency
of Bolivia, our colleagues in the COFI-project who collected the data—sometimes by hand— for Benin, Colombia and
Philippines. At a more personal level we thank Dr. Inmaculada Buendía Martinez for assistance in obtaining the
Spanish data and to André Leclerc for his devoted collaboration in the elaboration of the data base on Québec’s
cooperatives.
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from the Association of Spanish Cajas Rurales; v) Ontario Credit Union data was obtained from
the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Ontario (DICO); vi) data for FC Benin, Bolivia, Colombia,
Peru and Philippines was available to us from earlier works on individual countries performed under
the IDRC/DID financed research program;20 vii) data for Lithuania, Madagascar, Mali, Senegal
and Uruguay was provided to us by DID with authorization of the respective systems. All data
used in this work was subject to careful verification for consistency. We obtained data for 17,000
FC over 23 systems, in an unbalanced panel covering the period 1996-2002.
3.3 Macro-economic and social data
We ordered FC by the level of AH to which they may be exposed. We used two proxies of AH,
i) whether a country belongs to the OECD, and ii) the ratio of private credit by money banks
and other financial institutions to GDP. These are items 32d and 99b respectively of the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics. Our rationale to use these proxies of AH is that, other things
equal, the more developed an economy and the larger the level of private credit, the more complex
will be the mixture of financial products offered to customers of the financial system.21 We also
made use of the human development index (HDI)—that considers various factors associated with
quality of life— and governance quality indicators to describe the overall level of development of the
countries in the sample. All macro-economic and social data was obtained from the World Bank’s
database web site. Combining measures of AH and integration we obtain the following matrix:
Level of organization
Level of AH Ratio* AS CN SN
Low/ 0.00-0.20 Benin Senegal
non-OECD Lithuania
Madagascar
Mali
Medium/ 0.20-60 Bolivia Peru Uruguay
non-OECD Colombia
Philippines
High/ 0.60-1.50 UK (Indep. CU) Canada (Ontario CU) Canada (Desjardins)
OECD Italy (B. Popolari) Germany
Spain Ireland
Japan (CU) Italy (BC Cooperativo)
UK (ABCUL) Japan (Shinkin)
United States
*Note: Ratio of claims on private sector by bank and non-bank financial intermediaries over GDP. The
ranges were arbitrarily fixed to distribute into three relatively balanced groups.
There is obviously some overlapping when classifying countries by membership to the OECD
20The data for Peru, and for Bolivian FC supervised by the banking authorities (a subset of the 63 institutions
included in this study) are available in the respective banking authorities web sites.
21Good proxies of financial system development are hard to come by, but, as often the case in TCE economics,
proxies of contractual hazard are even harder. There is little agreement of what is a good measure of, e.g., asset
specificity, a key measure of vertical relations contractual risk. Like every proxy, ours has limitations. Besides the
fact that the correlation between private credit to GDP with AH may be uncomfortably low, other potential sources
of error can be identified. One of them is the dominant location (rural vs. urban) of the FC system. For example,
Bolivia and Senegal have a ratio of respectively 0.56 and 0.19 of private credit to GDP. However, Bolivian FC have
a very strong rural base while the system from Senegal studied here (PAMECAS) is based in the Dakar and Thiès
urban region. For those two regions (urban Senegal and rural Bolivia) the relationship could be reversed
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and by the ratio of private credit to GDP. The two lower AH categories by the second criteria are
all non-OECD countries, and countries included in the highest AH group are all OECD members.
4 The statistical analysis
4.1 Summary of testable hypothesis of interest
First we formulate the specific hypothesis we intend to analyze in the remainder of this paper.
While the theoretical framework summarized above generates a number of testable hypothesis, we
focus on the following.
• H1: Over ranges of low (high) AH low (high) integration will be related to higher
FC performance.22
Interpretation: Over ranges of low AH, FC tied up in loose and transient relations conserve
a relatively high level of efficiency. The situation is found in the poorest developing countries in
which FC is an incipient sector offering only very basic financial services. This is often all the
community they serve needs. We analyze whether integration has an effect on x-efficiency by
comparing individual FC x-efficiency between systems with low and high integration in countries
with low level of financial system development—our proxy of AH. In countries with low (high) AH,
differences in performance, if any, should be in favor of low (high) integration countries.23
• H2:Variability of FC performance (and size) falls with integration, particularly
in SN
Interpretation: The use of private ordering mechanisms (internal network regulation and super-
vision mechanisms) typically adopted by SN will result in a better control of performance indicators
and a lower likelihood of extreme events. With respect to size, higher integration should result in a
lower variance of size since networks solve input procurement problems through joint arrangements
rather than by growth or mergers.
• H3: EP increases with the size of the institution but less so in networks.
Interpretation: Since exposure to EP is positively related to size of the institution (due to limits
on governance and lack of separation of functions), over a range of large FC, differences in efficiency
and EP between members and non-members of networks will be relatively large. Empirically this
should translate into differences in x-efficiency or other measures of EP.24
22A more interesting hypothesis would have been the direct test whether integration is related directly to AH. Casual
observation confirms that FC systems in countries with a low level of financial system development tend to present
low integration. It is also obvious that FC systems in countries with a high level of financial system development
tend to present high integration. Unfortunately we cannot formally test this hypothesis since our sample of countries
is not randomly selected—we used countries for which we obtained the required institutional and financial data.
23 Inter-country comparisons of x-efficiency can be problematic. Thus, we take care to do all tests and adjustments
to the model the recent literature recommends in these cases and are presented below. Only after all correction
possible have been completed do we compare x-efficiency internationally. Further, we also use less sophisticated
measures of efficiency based on more primitive financial ratios. Thus, while the precisionist may object the use of
the rather sophisticated x-efficiency measure in an international context, for exploratory purposes it remains valid to
assess whether certain financial ratios are affected or not by integration levels.
24Once again, we are fully aware of the critique by Mester [1989] to the use of x-efficiency to measure EP. The main
point of the critique is that of the use of dummies —that modify the intercept—to measure differences in EP. However,
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4.2 Computing x-efficiency
Using a measure of x-efficiency and several performance ratios based on financial statement data,
we compare systems under the three regimes —AS, CN and SN. Among measures of efficiency, we
concentrate on the ratio of: i) total costs over total assets, ii) salaries over loans, of iii) other
expenses over loans, and iv) x-efficiency. We compare the ratios for the pooled (all countries)
data and for sub samples based on level of AH. In each case we will compare means and measures
of dispersion. While comparing means is of obvious interest, we emphasize dispersion given our
prediction that the more integrated systems make a more intense use of private ordering mechanisms
which should, in turn, result in lower variability in performance measures. X-efficiency is based
on a single standard translog cost function. The procedure adopted, follows the approach of Sealey
and Lindley [1977] that has become somewhat of a standard in the literature. We refer the reader
to Desrochers and Fischer [2003] (D&F) for details about it. More specifically, our model is inspired
from the adaptation for financial intermediaries of the work of Mitchell and Onvural [1996]. The
modifications are:
• Instead of using cross-sectional estimations, we adopt a distribution-free approach (DFA),
a methodology previously used in other studies (Berger [1993], Berger and Mester [1997],
Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore [2001]).
• We include various dummy variables to form adequate categories, an approach sometimes
favored (e.g. Westley and Shaffer [1999]). Following established practice (Fried, Lovell and
Eeckaut [1993], Hugues and Mester [1993], Rezvanian, Mehdian and Elyasiani [Spring 1996]
and Berger and Mester [1997]) we discriminate among five size categories.
• Since we use panel data, we decide upon the estimation procedure (fixed effect or random effect
estimators) by performing a Hausman test Hausman [1978]. This test is essential when using
panel to verify whether parameters should be drawn form a fixed effect estimator (unbiased
but inefficient) or a random effect estimator (efficient buy potentially biased if E[X | .] = 0,
that is, if the X matrix of covariates is not independent of individual factors ).25
• We do not include cost share equations, to reflect the fact that FC are not assumed to
minimize their costs as a joint stock bank would. This is consistent with the study of German
cooperative banks (Lang and Welzel [1996]).26
The model is defined as follows:
LnC = α0 + b
′
x+
1
2
x
′
Ax+ FF+ + ε (1)
Where:
given the huge range of economic and financial environments under which the systems considered here operate,
and the relatively simple statistics of comparison we use, we are convinced that the refinement proposed by Mester
does not add much in discriminatory power while complicating considerably the computation of efficiency measure,
specially considering that the modified approach applies to pairs of systems for which priors suggest differences in
EP. Given the exploratory character of the work we also use more primitive financial ratios that measure EP (such
as salaries to loans and administrative expenses to total assets) and that are not subject to the Mester critique.
25 If independence is verified the appropriate estimation procedure is one of random effect, and if it is not, the use
of fixed effect estimation procedures becomes imperative to avoid bias in the key coefficients. As shown Hausman
[1978], only one set of estimators is adequate for a specific sample, with one of them either inefficient, or biased.
26We note however that various authors imposed cost minimization for non-profit financial intermediaries (Murray
and White [1983], Rezvanian, Mehdian and Elyasiani [Spring 1996] and Westley and Shaffer [1999]).
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LnC= natural logarithm of costs;
α0 = a constant;
b = a vector of coefficients;
x = a matrix of variables including 3 non-scaled log-input prices, 2 non-scaled log-output
quantity, log of credit risk, and log of capitalization. As noted, we also include four dummy
variables to separate into five size groups. The scaling process is consistent with earlier work (e.g.
Mitchell and Onvural [1996]).
A = [Aw1, Aw2, Aw3, Ax1, Ax2, Ax3, Ay, AT , GR1, ..., GR9], a matrix of 15 coefficients most of
which are related to cross terms;
FF= a series of 60 Fourrier transform terms;
 = individual efficiency component of error;
ε = random error;
The usual constraints to insure homogeneity in input prices and symmetry of second-order
coefficients are imposed:
∑
3
i=1 bwi = 1,
∑
Aij= 0.
The dependent variable is total costs, including both operational expenses and interest expenses.
The independent variables include three input prices : Interest rate on deposits, cost of personnel,
and cost of fixed capital. We include two outputs, the quantity of loans and the quantity . All
these variables are unscaled. The reader is again referred to D&F for further details on Fourrier
transform terms, and error decomposition, respectively.
The error term is divided into an inefficiency () and a random (ε) component. The first
component is the core (or individual mean) inefficiency, estimated as the time average of each FC’s
residual, while the second component is the purely random component.
We consider X-efficiency as an indicator of performance. Our definition of efficiency Berger and
Mester [1997] is:
EFF =
Mini
i
(2)
Where Mini is the minimal cost associated to the most efficient FC, approximated by the 1%
fractile of our sample in order to avoid extreme observations. The interpretation of the ratio is that
it represents the proportion of costs that is efficiently used. For example, if Mini is representing
70% of i, 70% of costs of this FC is used efficiently, and 30% is wasted inefficiently. All FC having
a cost below the 1% fractile receive a 100% efficiency score.
It is standard in banking performance studies—cited above— to perform so-called ”correlate
regressions” in which the values of x-efficiency are regressed against a set of macroeconomic, in-
stitutional and bank-specific characteristics to explain the sources of variation in x-efficiency. We
abstain from performing these regressions for reasons of parsimony. We consider that, given the
large variety of environments in which our sample of FC operate, at best we would be able to iden-
tify a very incomplete set of factors explaining variations, resulting in a badly specified statistical
model. Thus we limit our analysis to simple non-parametric statistical procedures less dependent
on distributional assumptions of the variables involved.
5 Results
First, some general characteristics of the sample. Table III shows that income per capita varies
from US$35 500 in Japan to US$ 240 in Mali. The human development index (HDI) also presents
important variations from one country to another: Canada ranks third, while Mali ranks 153rd.
We also use governance quality indicators compiled by the World Bank. Table IV presents basic
characteristics of our sample of FC. The United States, Canada, Colombia, and Germany dominate
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the sample in terms of number of FC. Size of FC varies considerably between countries. Italian
Banche Popolari control US$5.3 billions of assets on average, followed by Japanese Shinkin banks
with US$4.4 billion. Among the smallest, Madagascar’s FC average assets of US$29 000 and FC
of Mali with US$109 000. The widest variation of size of assets is observed in less integrated
networks: Colombia’s standard deviation (SD) of assets reaches 10 times its mean, followed by
United States (4,7), and Peru (4,1). On average SD of size for AS, CN and SN are 4.03, 2.36 and
1.78. These statistics provides support to H2.
============================
Please insert Table III and Table IV here
============================
5.1 Integration and performance
Table V presents several ratios for the whole sample and for OECD and non-OECD countries.
We include means and SD of several financial ratios (costs over assets, net income over salaries,
salaries over loans, loans over deposits, deposits over capital, and capital over assets (leverage)), all
determinants of ROA for FC operating under the three regimes, for the entire sample, for OECD
and non-OECD countries and including and excluding the Unites States. The latter distinction
was needed due to the relative importance of that country’s sample. Strikingly, ratios that reflect
cost structure and profitability, the mean (for cost ratios) and SD falls unambiguously as one moves
from AS to CN to SN, and the differences are statistically significant, for both the mean and the
SD. This is true for the entire, OECD and non-OECD sample (except one ratio in the latter case).
From the point of view of a supervisor, the declining SD is important information, since it reveals
that higher integration reduces the risk of extreme events (failure). Given its importance, we will
study the characteristics of the distribution with more detail—using quintiles—later on. The ratios
related to financing (loans/deposits, deposits/capital and capital/assets) present less uniformity.
Excluding the United States accentuates the trend in the cost ratios. That is, the United States
tends to improve performance of the consensual group. In some cases, exclusion of the United
States makes performance of CN worse than that of AS. These statistics provide support to H1
and H2.
======================
Please insert Table V here
======================
In Table VI we focus on two cost ratios: x-efficiency (Panel A) and salaries/loans (Panel B),
using quintiles. The latter is a ratio often used to measure FC administrative cost structure. Both
ratios are expressed in %. In the table, to save space and provide better overview, we only present
the first (5%), third (median, 50%) and last (95%) quintiles. In a fourth column we present the
percentage change in the value of the ratio between the first and last quintile. In Table VI this is our
measure of variation within the sample. At the bottom of each cell, we provide means of quintiles
and variation between smallest and largest groups of FC. The table has been divided into the three
groups (AS, CN and SN) and each into five size categories. We present results for OECD and
non-OECD subsamples. The empty cells mean that there are no observations for that particular
organization form and size. Typically absent are larger FC in non-OECD countries or AS in OECD
countries.27 The blocks of AS and SN for OECD with and without the United States have the same
27The two sizes available are those of the AICUL system in the UK.
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values, those of CN change due to exclusion of the United States. Presenting and comparing data
by quintiles and size categories is a non-parametric approach fruitfully used to study performances
in the banking sector (e.g. Humphrey [1987]). The approach has two advantages, it eliminates
consideration of the extreme—and thus less likely— observations, and allows to verify consistency
across sizes. The numbers in Table VI do not contradict conclusions drawn on Table V, but allow a
finer analysis. Statistics presented in Table V might have been influenced by extreme observations—
beyond the 5% and 95% quintiles. Quintiles do not present the same unambiguous pattern observed
in that Table. Another important observations is that, for a few exceptions, variations between
sizes (for the same quintile) are much smaller than variations across quintiles (for the same size).
This means that in-sample (quintile) variation is much larger than inter-sample (size) variation.
This is typical of banking, notably in Humphrey [1987], the first to notice. It means that one
should be cautious about inter-size comparisons. Using the same logic as Humphrey, we computed
(last column of Table VI) the difference between the largest and smallest median for each size. By
and large the variation of medians between systems is somewhat larger than between sizes. We
can thus say that the way a FC system is organized has equal or more impact on the performance
of its members than the size they have.28 Scales economies are often seen as key factor in the
performance of FC, while little attention has been paid to the way FC interact between them. The
table suggests that there is more to be obtained in performance improvement by efficient integration
strategies than by increase in size of individual FC. This berates the emphasis on mergers of many
FC systems that seek to increase their competitive advantage in the modern market place.
======================
Please insert Table VI here
======================
With respect to x-efficiency we observe that, for non-OECD countries, average variation be-
tween extreme quintiles is the smallest for SN. However, variation is higher for CN than AS. For
OECD countries variation decreases from AS to CN to SN, unambiguously, with and without the
United States included in the sample. With respect to the AS (AICUL of UK), we note that x-
efficiency is higher and variation about the same as the other two groups. Another interesting —and
for us important—observation is that variation between extreme quintiles tends to increase with the
size, reaching a peak and then falling again, almost for all groups, but somewhat less so for SN in
non-OECD.29 This is an observation that goes against established intuition that in small FC the
likelihood of extreme events increases, but support our conjecture that EP are more difficult to
control in larger FC. Larger FC are more prone to extreme events than smaller ones.
With respect to the salaries to loans ratio, for non-OECD countries the median increases from
AS to CN to SN. That is, as integration increases, it becomes more expensive to produce loans.
However, the change between extreme quintiles falls in the same direction. Networks structures
are more expensive to manage, which is as expected, however, more integrated networks tend to
better control deviations from the mean or median. In most cases the ratio tends to fall with the
size of the FC. For OECD countries, the pattern of the median depends whether one includes the
United States in the sample. With, the average ratio goes up from AS to CN and falls again from
CN to SN. Without, the average ratio goes first down and then up again. There is, however an
28Humphrey, focusing on the United States banking systems, concluded that this pattern of variation suggests that
the existence of economies of scale in banking should have little competitive impact relative to the competitive effects
that exist already as a result of large differences in cost levels.
29The low variation in the largest size (>200 MM) is due mostly to the Japanese Shinkin (all), some Japanese
credit unions and some German Raiffeisen FC. These three systems appear to present a particularly low variation in
performance across quintiles.
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unambiguous fall in the variability of the ratio from AS to CN to SN, with the United States, and an
increase from AS to CN and a fall from CN to SN without. The lowest variability is always for SN.
In general we can still say that integration tends to reduce variability (H2). However, we cannot
unambiguously say that performance improves with integration (H1). While prudence should be
exercised in comparing sizes, we note however the following. In non-OECD countries the average
median and variability of salaries/loans is the highest in CN. Both the median and the variability is
the lowest for AS, followed by SN. This suggests that in countries that have advanced integration,
SN tend to control best variability. For OECD countries, variability across sizes decreases from AS
to CN to SN. That is, expense preferences tend to be controlled best in SN.
In Table VII we pool once again the OECD and non-OECD countries and divide the entire pool
into five size groups. The observations made about variation across quintile and across size, suggests
that any interpretation should be taken with caution. It is, nonetheless, worth considering. We note
that for almost every size category, the ratios of (other) administrative expenses to assets, salaries to
loans ratios improve with integration. X-efficiency is somewhat erratic. Variability almost always
decreases with integration except for x-efficiency in some cases. The effect is accentuated when
excluding the United States. Comparing across sizes we observe the following. In the case of other
expenses the trend is erratic. However, the highest values are not for the group of the smallest, but
for one of the largest groups (25-200). In the case of salaries the ratio increased unambiguously
with size for AS, and decreases somewhat with CN and SN. For x-efficiency, we observe a decrease
for AS, no change for CN and an increase for SN. These statistics provide support for H3. Another
observation that can be made with this table is the following. If the complex apex organization of
a SN are by necessity more expensive to run than those of a CN or an AS, overall cost performance
improves. Apex fees fall under non-salary administrative expenses, in Table VII the ratio is lower for
SN than either CN or SN except for the 25-200 millions group. This is consistent with the notion
that SN economize in bounded rationality by pooling strategic planning and asset management
functions to the hub and reducing the competence scope of base nodes.
======================
Please insert Table VII here
======================
5.2 Strategic or consensual?
The step of ceding decision and supervision power to apex organizations—now the ”hub”— over a
designates segment of issues and products of strategic importance is a critical one. This converts
a CN into a SN. It is a difficult decision that can easily result in a split of the movement, as
more disciplined, willing to engage in deeper integration—often smaller— FC will encourage the step,
and less disciplined and willing to integrate —often larger— FC will resist. At the same time, a SN
requires an organizational kernel that is larger and more expensive to run as the hub adds numerous
functions to that of a CN apex. These are governance structures designed to facilitate cooperative
adaptation under conditions of high AH which tend to be more expensive to run, affecting cost
performance at the level of the FC, positively if AH is high, negatively if AH is low. However the
centralization should relieve the need for capacities in multiple member FC with an overall gain in
bureaucratic efficiency and cost, provided that AH is sufficiently high. It is thus of interest to ask
the question: under what conditions is this strategic step beneficial? One particular feature we used
in formulating our taxonomy was the fact that, in SN, the network defines a ”designated segment”
of joint production or contracting of services under the hub’s control, whose use is mandatory for
member FC.
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Thus, in Table VIII we asked the question: do SN outperform AS and CN taken together?30
We pose this question for two reasons: i) the theoretical framework suggests that for lower AH high
integration may not be optimal; ii) it is a common prescription for movements of FC in developing
countries to adopt practices of network governance common among SN (delegated monitoring,
unified image, internal solidarity mechanisms, etc.). However, for this analysis we considered the
division of the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries too crude. Instead we used the second
proxy, the three level scale based on the ratio of claims on private sector by bank and non-bank
financial intermediaries over GDP. In Panel A we present levels and variations (SD) for the three
ratios used before, and in Panel B we test for differences. Observing Panel A one immediately
notices that for countries with low AH, performance indicators of non-SN are superior to those of
SN, and interestingly, variability is also lower —except for x-efficiency in the first period. For high
AH exactly the opposite is true. Both level and variability of ratios is better in SN. When we test
for differences we observe that most differences are highly significant. For medium AH we have no
observations in the first period.31 However, for the second period the pattern is one of improved
performance of SN—except in salaries— and reduced variability. This supports the theory derived
hypothesis of networks formation we are evaluating, particularly H3. In countries with low level of
AH high integration might be suboptimal. As AH increases higher integration becomes optimal.
However, despite this support we are reluctant to unambiguously support the proposition that the
low AH countries that adopted advance forms of integration and organization (in our case Senegal)
have done wrong. We explain this reluctance below. The statistics in this table also support the
conclusion drawn for Table VII that despite more expensive apex structures, cost performance is
superior in SN that in CN and AS for medium to higher levels of AH.
======================
Please insert Table VIII here
======================
6 Limitations of the study and results
Like most multi country studies covering a wide range of economic, institutional and cultural
environment, this study is subject to limitations. First, the huge variation in size, number and
levels of efficiency between FC and in the economic, legal and social environments under which
they operate suggest that any conclusion should be stated very cautiously. Indeed there might be
sources of variations which we do not measure or even consider —due to lack of data or theory—
that could influence the outcome. One particular weakness is the variability in the number of
observations for different systems. The panel is very unbalanced, although we controlled for this to
a limited extent. Quality of data is often a concern in multinational studies. However, prudence did
not tie us down. The data used was subject to very rigorous filters by us and other agents before
us. Further, we intentionally limited ourselves to use entries that present lower measurement error
(e.g. total assets, salaries, deposits, net income,etc.).
The results tend to support the hypothesis consistent with theory that for very low levels of AH,
high integration is suboptimal from the point of view of costs. While pleasing from a pure research
point of views, we are ambiguous about this result.32 This would suggest that poor-country FC
30We present aggregated results to save space, but country-specific results are also available upon request. They
are supportive of the same evidence on relative strength of particular networks.
31This is the COFAC federation of Uruguay.
32TCE, as a branch of economics, has over the years grown in confidence because its predictions tend to find
remarkable in the data (Williamson [1996]: 372-374). This is once again the case.
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cannot benefit from advanced integration and should not be encouraged to do so. This may indeed
be the unavoidable policy consequence. But such policy recommendations are also problematic for
several reasons: i) they imply low inter-FC reducing their ability to face increased complexities in the
demand of financial services by its members. ii) low integrations also reduces their ability to perform
successful regulatory advocacy in the face of unfriendly or unwitting —about the particularities of
FC regulatory needs—banking authorities; iii) often, advanced integration with inclusion of private
ordering mechanisms is the only way to protect member savings from the consequences of EP
inclined managers, as our results appear to confirm. When Willhelm Raiffeisen—back in the late
19th century when German financial markets were far from sophisticated— introduced ambulatory
auditors visiting the rural Kassen on horse or donkey backs offering both prudential supervision
and management advisory services, he introduced a qualitative jump in the functioning of those FC
with enormous long-term consequences—the development of today’s successful auditing federation
model that characterizes systems that emulate the Raiffeisen model. The same applies to a number
of other integration initiatives proposed then by Raiffeisen and followed worldwide since. The model
of FC network creation lacks the details to take all these elements into consideration. However,
overcoming this limitation in the modeling exercise is far from obvious. Needless to say, these are
questions we intend to address in future research.
However, we consider the study a worthwhile exploratory exercise to assess the usefulness of a
theoretical framework that generates distinct predictions explaining the old habit of FC to integrate
themselves into networks of varying complexity and the influence these networks have on relatively
simple efficiency measures. We can draw two sufficiently solid conclusions that we believe justify the
work. First, that there is a strong interaction between efficiency and level of integration—and not
always in a single direction. Higher (lower) integration tends to improve efficiency of FC in markets
with higher (lower) levels of maturity of the financial sector. Stated differently, the challenges
of an increasingly sophisticated financial market are best faced through networks of advanced
functionality that imply higher (lower) cooperative (autonomous) adaptation. Second, integration
definitively appears to play a role in controlling EP and variability in individual FC performance,
and this in an almost unambiguous way. For wide ranges of FC size, higher integration—that
generally involve the adoption by the network of private ordering mechanisms—appears to limit EP
and variability of performance.
7 Conclusions
This paper analyzes in an international context hypotheses derived from a theory of organization
of financial cooperatives (FC). This theory proposes two central ideas. First, that the imperative
to control uncertainty and exploit economies of scales when procuring inputs needed to perform
the intermediation process, is the driving force behind the creation of networks of FC. Second,
that the severity of contractual hazard results from those lateral agreements between FC, which
in turn depends on specific characteristics of products object of lateral contracting, determines
the organizational complexity of these networks. Thus, classical inter-FC organizations —such as
leagues, federation and confederations— are just organizations known in the theory of transaction
costs economics (TCE) as hybrids, that present governance structures whose complexity depends
upon the relative level of autonomous or cooperative adaptations to disturbances intended in their
design. Systems—or groups—of FC tend to adopt the type of organization that economizes in bounded
rationality and the combination of governance and input procurement costs, while conforming to
traditions—or path dependence—and legal supporting environment. Among hypotheses resulting
from that theoretical framework we focused on three: i) over ranges of low (high) AH, low (high)
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integration will be related to higher FC performance resulting from reduced governance costs; ii)
variability of FC performance (and size) and thus the likelihood of low performance events falls
with integration, particularly in strategic networks; and iii) expense preferences increases with the
size of the institution but less so in networks.
We then proceed to analyze these hypothesis on individual FC financial data for a sample of
23 systems with a total of 17,000 institutions with observations for up to five years in countries
as diverse as the United States and Mali. We focused on measures of standard x-efficiency —often
used in the banking literature—and on more primitive ratios that measure performance and expense
preferences. The sheer size and diversity of the sample makes high variability in data quality
unavoidable. Thus we chose to perform all comparisons employing rudimentary and non-parametric
statistics avoiding inferences on more complex tools that dependent on restrictive distributional
assumptions and data refinement. Overall, results suggest a weak support for the first hypothesis,
a strong support for the second hypothesis and a weak support for the third hypothesis. With
respect to the first we cannot unambiguously state that in high (low) AH environments, high (low)
integration yield unambiguously higher performance in all measures used. However, by and large,
the trend is one of higher performance with higher integration. However, unambiguously, higher
integration reduces cross sectional volatility in measure of performance and size. In other words,
the likelihood of low performance events tends to fall, a result that is of definitive interest to
regulators and supervisor. With respect to the third hypothesis, our data—and within the limits
of the methodology employed— support the proposition that EP tends to increase with size of the
institution -at least over a wide range of sizes—but that this is less the case in more integrated
systems. Another important conclusion is that except for systems presenting low levels of AH,
despite the higher costs of running a strategic network hub organization, the overall cost of running
the network falls with integration. This is consistent with the notion that strategic networks
economize in bounded rationality by pooling strategic planning and asset management functions
to the hub and reducing the competence scope of base nodes. The study is subject to a number of
limitations that we state in the text. Finally, we hope that we have made the point that the study
of the causes, modalities and consequences of alliances and networks of systems of FC is a fertile
territory of research with important implications for FC performances.
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Representation The central node represents the system in issues of common concern (regulation, 
taxation, other cooperative movements, etc.).
Cooperative Education The central node provides or supports cooperative education among members of first 
tier nodes.
Advisory and prudential services The central node provides business and/or prudential management services for 
the first tier nodes.
Voluntary pooling of resources 
and standardization
The first tier node is made responsible for the management of common resources and 
to support standardization of operating procedures across the system.
Market sharing The network has rules by which inter-nodes competition is eliminated.
Unique image The network assumes a unique trade mark and image to which all first-tier node 
adhere.
Delegation of strategic planning 
function
The central node is given the function to perform strategic planning for the 
system, although there is no mandatory compliance of strategic plans approved 
by the system.
Separation of strategic and 
operational decision 
management
There is separation of strategic and operational decision management between 
central nodes (strategic) and first-tier nodes (operational). First- and second tier 
nodes are bound by network decisions. This includes mandatory pooling of 
resources and standardizations of operations in areas chosen by the network.
Prudential supervision role The central node assumes the role of prudential supervisor (or auxiliary supervisor) of 
first tier nodes 
Contractual solidarity The networks introduces mechanisms of collective insurance designed to assist first or 
second tier nodes in difficulties
Note: These characteristics determine the main traits that we use to categorize the systems of FC.
Table I: Characteristics of networks
Atomized 
system
Consensual 
networks
Strategic 
networks
Country Type / Network Representation
Cooperative 
education
Prudential and 
management 
training
Voluntary pooling of 
resources / 
standardization Market sharing Unique image
Delegation of 
strategic planning 
responsibilities
Separation of 
strategic and 
operational 
planning 
function
Internal 
governance - 
Auto control Subsidiarity
Contractual 
solidarity
Canada Strategic / Desjardins Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Consensual / Ontario's Credit 
Unions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
United States Consensual - NCUA Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Japan
Consensual / Japan's Credit 
Unions Yes Yes Yes * Yes * No * No * No * No * Yes * No *
Strategic / Shinkin banks Yes Yes Yes * Yes * Yes Yes Yes * Yes Yes Yes * Yes
United Kingdom Consensual / ABCUL Yes Yes Yes Yes No * No No No No No No
Atomized / Remaining Credit 
Unions Yes Yes / No Yes / No No No No No No No NA No
Germany Strategic / Raiffeisen Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ireland Strategic / ILCU Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Italy Strategic / Cassa Raiffeisen and 
Banca Cooperativa Yes Yes Yes * Yes * Yes Yes Yes * Yes Yes Yes * Yes
Consensual / Banca Popolare Yes Yes * Yes * Yes * No No No * No No Yes * No
Spain Consensual / Cajas Espanolas Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes
Uruguay Strategic / Cofac Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
LCU - Lithuania Consensual / LCU Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Colombia Atomized / Confecoop Yes Yes No No No No No No No NA No
Philippines Atomized / Cooperative rural 
banks No No No No No No No No No NA No
Peru Consensual / Fenacrep Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Bolivia Atomized / Bolivian's Credit 
Unions Yes Yes No * No * No No No No No NA No
Madagascar Consensual / Otiv Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Senegal Strategic / Pamecas Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Benin Consensual / Fenacrep Yes Yes Yes * Yes * No * No Yes * No Yes Yes * Yes
Mali Consensual / Nyesigiso Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
OECD Members
Non-OECD Members
Note: 15214 financial cooperatives of OEDC countries and 1813 financial cooperatives of Non-OEDC countries were included into our sample.  Size of assets vary widely from one network to another (Mean value varies between US$4361 millions and US$29000), and
Table II: Categorization of networks
Atomized network Consensual network Strategic network
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Country Income per Capita HDI rank
Voice and 
Accountability
Political 
Stability
Government 
Effectiveness
Regulatory 
Quality Rule of Law
Control of 
Corruption
Separation of 
strategic and 
operational 
planning function
Canada US$ 21040 3 1,36 1,11 1,89 1,32 1,89 2,21 1,36
United States US$ 34680 6 1,34 0,91 1,73 1,46 1,77 1,77 1,18
Japan US$ 35500 9 1,02 1,16 1,10 0,76 1,62 1,26 2,44
United Kingdom US$ 24430 14 1,40 0,98 2,06 1,64 1,91 2,06 3,48
Germany US$ 25120 17 1,43 1,24 1,76 1,36 1,83 1,85 0,97
Ireland US$ 22960 18 1,40 1,33 1,72 1,55 1,77 1,77 0,90
Italy US$ 20160 20 1,11 0,87 0,87 0,86 0,92 0,78 0,65
Spain US$ 15080 21 1,18 0,81 1,66 1,22 1,26 1,36 1,13
Uruguay US$ 6000 37 0,85 0,79 0,60 0,83 0,55 0,59 0,88
Lithuania US$ 2770 47 0,85 0,58 0,30 0,49 0,20 0,12 0,30
Colombia US$ 2020 62 -0,36 -1,47 -0,15 0,24 -0,63 -0,47 1,01
Philippines US$ 1040 70 0,30 -0,19 0,09 0,38 -0,29 -0,43 1,18
Peru US$ 2080 74 -0,31 -0,59 -0,18 0,56 -0,43 -0,15 0,47
Bolivia US$ 990 104 0,17 -0,23 -0,37 0,53 -0,52 -0,69 0,94
Madagascar US$ 250 135 0,21 0,00 -0,47 -0,23 -0,66 -0,28 0,29
Senegal US$ 490 145 -0,15 -0,76 -0,04 -0,27 -0,23 -0,35 0,40
Benin US$ 370 147 0,45 0,50 -0,25 -0,10 -0,32 -0,59 0,25
Mali US$ 240 153 0,28 0,19 -0,68 -0,04 -0,63 -0,44 0,27
Source: Governance Research Indicators Project, World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance)
Table III: Country statistics (ordered by HDI)
OECD Members
Note: Our sample includes financial cooperatives from 18 countries which have reached very different levels of development (from 3rd HDI rank to 153th), very different levels of quality of State 
governance, and different levels of development of the financial sector (from 3.48 times GDP to 0.25 time GDP).
Tab IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (5)/(4)
Country Type / Network
# of 
institutio
ns Period Obs  Mean  Std Dev Median  Max
Std Dev 
/Mean
Canada Strategic / Desjardins 1316 1996-2000 5 991 28 829 48 009 17 540 1 517 380 1,7
Consensual / Ontario's 
Credit Unions 466 1996-2000 2 796 18 465 54 663 2 401 694 923 3,0
United States Consensual - NCUA 10107 1996-2001 60 642 34 746 163 626 6 337 13 000 500 4,7
Japan
Consensual / Japan's 
Credit Unions 268 1996-2001 979 587 721 911 968 325 419 10 731 400 1,6
Strategic / Shinkin banks 404 1996-2001 1 568 4 360 500 16 004 400 1 438 020 198 958 000 3,7
United Kingdom Strategic / ABCUL 447 1996-1998 1 156 368 1 329 58 18 095 3,6
Atomized / Remaining 
Credit Unions 258 1996-1998 671 243 508 48 4 198 2,1
Germany Strategic / Raiffeisen 1200 1996-2001 5 653 405 719 765 843 252 424 18 014 700 1,9
Ireland Strategic / ILCU 106 1996-1998 318 3 854 6 388 2 107 57 524 1,7
Italy
Strategic / Cassa 
Raiffeisen 47 1996-2001 282 64 600 78 677 46 914 401 549 1,2
Strategic / Banca 
Cooperativa 430 1996-2001 1 986 124 000 337 000 53 000 7 334 382 2,7
Consensual / Banca 
Popolare 65 1996-2001 390 5 304 411 8 071 747 1 534 706 40 152 084 1,5
Spain
Consensual / Cajas 
Espanolas 100 1996-2001 553 293 372 647 549 83 393 6 477 810 2,2
Uruguay Strategic / Cofac 29 2000-2002 90 8 370 3 882 7 451 22 597 0,5
LCU - Lithuania Consensual / LCU 44 1999-2002 134 159 206 87 1 342 1,3
Colombia Atomized / Confecoop 1225 1996-2000 7 315 461 4 627 7 188 385 10,0
Philippines
Atomized / Cooperative 
rural banks 50 1995-1999 213 1 206 2 046 579 16 229 1,7
Peru Consensual / Fenacrep 207 1997-2001 873 954 3 872 117 38 179 4,1
Bolivia
Atomized / Bolivian's 
Credit Unions 63 1996-2001 237 9 500 21 494 2 378 155 375 2,3
Madagascar Strategic / Otiv 16 1997-2002 72 29 39 17 190 1,3
Senegal Strategic / Pamecas 28 1998-2001 102 196 154 152 785 0,8
Benin Consensual / Fececam 97 1995-2000 482 329 252 266 2 752 0,8
Mali Consensual / Nyesigiso 54 1997-2002 277 109 83 89 465 0,8
Table IV: Total assets of financial cooperatives considered in each country, ordered by HDI rank 
OECD Members
Non-OECD Members
Note: 15214 financial cooperatives of OEDC countries and 1813 financial cooperatives of Non-OEDC countries were included into our sample.  Size of assets vary 
widely from one network to another (Mean value varies between US$4361 millions and US$29000), and within each network. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Atomized
Consen
sual
Consensual w/o 
United States Strategic Atomized
Consen
sual
Consensual w/o 
United States
Strategi
c Atomized Consensual Strategic
Total costs / Total assets 0,767 0,045 ** 0,058 ** 0,040 ** 0,074 0,041 ** 0,058 0,040 ** 0,871 0,202 ** 0,124 **
Standard Deviation 13,625 0,104 ** 0,327 ** 0,065 ** 0,241 0,096 ** 0,327 ** 0,065 ** 14,610 0,209 ** 0,042 **
N 5 137 66 793 5 205 16 637 671 64 990 5 205 16 637 4 466 1 803 191
R1: Net result / Salaries 2,057 0,371 ** 2,211 0,245 ** 18,735 0,376 ** 2,211 ** 0,245 ** 0,279 0,204 -1,557
Standard Deviation 18,328 6,764 ** 25,741 4,184 ** 54,375 6,844 ** 25,741 4,184 ** 4,933 2,520 ** 13,810
N 4 619 65 931 4 498 16 557 445 64 148 4 498 16 557 4 174 1 783 191
0,638 5,8% ** 2,4% ** 0,036 ** 0,024 0,045 ** 0,024 0,036 ** 0,737 0,584 0,125 **
7,260 50,9% ** 5,3% ** 0,028 ** 0,127 0,308 ** 0,053 ** 0,028 ** 7,816 2,625 ** 0,073 **
N 4 752 66 408 5 150 16 635 657 64 861 5 150 16 635 4 095 1 547 191
R3: Loans / Deposits 11,230 0,874 ** 0,705 ** 0,834 ** 0,672 0,745 ** 0,705 ** 0,834 ** 13,648 6,531 ** 1,080 **
54,440 6,275 ** 0,231 ** 0,274 ** 0,288 0,306 ** 0,231 ** 0,274 ** 60,093 41,610 0,848 **
N 3 591 8 5 196 16 632 669 64 978 5 196 16 632 2 922 1 481 191
R4: Deposits / Capital 1,942 7,121 ** 10,392 ** 7,846 ** 11,118 7,245 ** 10,392 7,846 ** 0,568 2,644 ** 2,827 **
10,526 6,165 ** 12,965 7,152 * 27,244 6,021 ** 12,965 7,152 * 1,361 8,987 6,497 **
N 5 135 66 772 5 196 16 632 669 64 972 5 196 16 632 4 466 1 800 191
R5: Capital / Assets 0,641 0,154 ** 0,123 ** 0,171 ** 0,143 0,144 0,123 ** 0,171 ** 0,716 0,513 ** 0,287 **
1,900 0,112 ** 0,125 ** 0,135 ** 0,117 0,072 ** 0,125 ** 0,135 ** 2,027 0,386 ** 0,380 **
N 5 137 66 793 5 205 16 637 671 64 990 5 205 16 637 4 466 1 803 191
R6: ROA 0,000 0,006 ** 0,008 ** 0,002 0,033 0,000 ** 0,008 ** 0,002 ** -0,005 -0,008 -0,017
0,143 0,025 ** 0,036 ** 0,066 ** 0,030 0,143 0,036 ** 0,066 ** 0,153 0,122 0,528
N 4 766 63 543 4 801 12 251 671 4 766 4 801 12 251 4 095 1 798 190
Note: * significant at the 5% level; ** at the 1% level.
Note: The level of significance reported in the "mean" line, in column (2) is related to T-Test of mean differences between column (1) and (2); in column (3) for T-Test of mean differences between (1) and (3); in column (4) 
between (1) and (4), and similar
Note: The level of significance reported in the "Standard Deviation" line, in column (2) is related to F-Test of comparison of variances between column (1) and (2); in column (3) for F-Test of comparison of variances between (1) 
and (3); in column (4) bet
Note: We observe that the proportion of wages over loans reduces with a greater level of integration. We also observe that leverage increases with integration, resulting into a greater ROA ratio. 
Table V: Diverse performance measures
ROA = R1*R2*R3*R4*R5
Complete Sample OECD Countries Non OECD Countries
CN SN
5-ile 50-ile 95-ile Ch. 5-ile 50-ile 95-ile Ch. 5-ile 50-ile 95-ile Ch.
<1M 85,9% 91,6% 95,3% 0,11 84,4% 90,7% 95,6% 0,13 90,7% 91,9% 93,3% 0,03 0,01
1-5M 85,4% 90,8% 94,3% 0,10 86,4% 91,0% 95,5% 0,11 88,8% 93,3% 94,2% 0,06 0,03
5-25M 83,2% 90,2% 95,8% 0,15 78,8% 87,6% 97,9% 0,24 88,4% 92,5% 95,3% 0,08 0,06
25-200M 85,2% 90,7% 99,9% 0,17 85,7% 90,5% 96,0% 0,12 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
>200M n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Change -0,01 -0,01 0,05 0,02 0,00 0,00 -0,03 0,01 0,02
Mean 84,9% 90,8% 96,3% 0,13 83,8% 90,0% 96,2% 0,15 89,3% 92,5% 94,2% 0,06 0,03
87,0% 91,3% 95,4% 0,10 89,3% 91,0% 92,5% 0,04 86,8% 91,0% 95,1% 0,10 0,00
1-5M 89,1% 91,7% 94,5% 0,06 89,3% 91,0% 92,5% 0,04 87,1% 91,0% 94,7% 0,09 0,01
5-25M n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 89,4% 90,8% 92,8% 0,04 87,2% 91,4% 98,6% 0,13 0,01
25-200M n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 89,0% 90,6% 94,0% 0,06 85,6% 90,6% 100,0% 0,17 0,00
>200M n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 88,8% 91,1% 95,2% 0,07 88,4% 90,8% 92,7% 0,05 0,00
Change 0,02 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,03 0,02 0,00 -0,03
Mean 0,88 0,91 0,95 0,08 89,1% 90,9% 93,4% 0,05 87,0% 91,0% 96,2% 0,11 0,00
<1M 87,0% 91,3% 95,4% 0,10 86,4% 89,3% 93,0% 0,08 86,8% 91,0% 95,1% 0,10 0,02
1-5M 89,1% 91,7% 94,5% 0,06 86,6% 89,3% 92,9% 0,07 87,1% 91,0% 94,7% 0,09 0,03
5-25M n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 86,9% 90,8% 100,0% 0,15 87,2% 91,4% 98,6% 0,13 0,01
25-200M n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 85,9% 91,0% 100,0% 0,16 85,6% 90,6% 100,0% 0,17 0,00
>200M n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 88,1% 91,2% 98,9% 0,12 88,4% 90,8% 92,7% 0,05 0,00
Change 0,02 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 0,02 0,08 0,02 0,00 -0,03
Mean 0,88 0,91 0,95 0,08 86,8% 90,3% 97,0% 0,12 87,0% 91,0% 96,2% 0,11 0,01
Ch. max and min 
median
OECD (w. United States)
OECD (w/o United States)
Table VI: Comparisson of Systems Based on Quintiles
Panel A: Efficiency
Non-OECD
AS
CN SN
5-ile 50-ile 95-ile 5-ile 50-ile 95-ile Ratio 5-ile 50-ile 95-ile
<1M 0,26% 2,00% 12,13% 45,65 1,56% 6,87% 28,29% 17,13 3,76% 7,20% 40,00% 9,64 2,60
1-5M 0,17% 2,00% 21,01% 122,59 1,58% 7,62% 20,45% 11,94 5,78% 8,07% 12,74% 1,20 3,04
5-25M 0,15% 2,00% 34,84% 231,27 2,20% 15,28% 29,67% 12,49 2,73% 4,69% 8,02% 1,94 6,64
25-200M 1,23% 2,56% 40,00% 31,52 1,41% 1,97% 2,46% 0,74 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
>200M n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Change 3,73 0,28 2,30 -0,10 -0,71 -0,91 -0,27 -0,35 -0,80
Mean 0,45% 2,14% 27,00% 107,76 1,69% 7,94% 20,22% 10,58 4,09% 6,65% 20,25% 4,26 4,09
<1M 0,26% 2,00% 12,13% 45,65 0,01% 2,20% 7,72% 2,5 0,01% 0,01% 3,85% n.a. n.a.
1-5M 0,17% 2,00% 21,01% 122,6 0,25% 2,83% 6,02% 23,08 0,62% 2,33% 4,03% 5,50 -0,18
5-25M n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0,99% 2,73% 4,92% 3,97 1,30% 2,06% 3,21% 1,47 -0,25
25-200M n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0,75% 2,57% 4,13% 4,51 1,32% 2,08% 3,68% 1,79 -0,19
>200M n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,31% 2,59% 5,65% 3,31 1,17% 2,06% 3,32% 1,84 -0,20
Change -0,35 0,00 0,73 4,24 0,18 -0,27 0,89 -0,12 -0,14
Mean 0,22% 2,00% 16,57% 84,12 0,66% 2,58% 5,69% 7,5 0,88% 1,71% 3,62% 2,65 -0,20
<1M 0,26% 2,00% 12,13% 45,65 0,01% 0,09% 1,19% 12,2 0,01% 0,01% 3,85% n.a. n.a.
1-5M 0,17% 2,00% 21,01% 122,6 0,01% 0,24% 1,63% 5,8 0,62% 2,33% 4,03% 5,50 8,71
5-25M n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0,01% 0,43% 5,21% 11,1 1,30% 2,06% 3,21% 1,47 3,79
25-200M n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0,04% 0,94% 5,49% 136,3 1,32% 2,08% 3,68% 1,79 1,21
>200M n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,33% 3,06% 6,26% 3,71 1,17% 2,06% 3,32% 1,84 -0,33
Change -0,35 0,00 0,73 32,3 33,0 4,26 0,89 -0,12 -0,14
Mean 0,22% 2,00% 16,57% 84,12 0,28% 0,95% 3,96% 33,8 0,88% 1,71% 3,62% 2,65 3,35
OECD (w/o United States)
Notes: (*) In this table the value of 0.01% is an absolute minimum value. Actual values are lower. These values were ignored when computing changes, thus the 
next neighbor value was used.
Non-OECD
AS Ch. max and min 
median
OECD (w. United States)
Table VI (Continued)    Panel B: Salaries/Loans (%)(*)
Tab VII
Category N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Atomized # 14,90% 12,40% 4,25% 7,17% 81,85% 4,54%
Consensual # 3,15% 4,83% 4,45% 4,71% 90,85% 2,26%
Strategic # 3,01% 4,64% 4,32% 5,33% 90,98% 2,87%
Category N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Atomized # 8,01% 9,52% 5,91% 7,97% 81,48% 4,08%
Consensual # 1,25% 1,35% 3,18% 2,10% 90,97% 1,19%
Strategic # 0,53% 0,79% 2,53% 1,34% 90,88% 2,70%
Category N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Atomized # 6,89% 8,50% 6,84% 11,44% 81,55% 6,12%
Consensual # 1,24% 0,90% 2,89% 1,42% 90,89% 1,57%
Strategic # 0,67% 0,95% 2,34% 1,12% 91,43% 3,96%
Category N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Atomized # 18,27% 15,78% 17,62% 15,55% 80,64% 3,69%
Consensual # 1,40% 0,94% 2,74% 1,11% 90,91% 2,02%
Strategic # 1,43% 1,29% 2,65% 1,23% 91,00% 3,48%
Category N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Consensual # 1,38% 0,83% 2,47% 1,08% 91,45% 2,62%
Strategic # 1,29% 0,66% 2,30% 0,90% 90,59% 1,57%
> US$200M
Other expenses Salaries X-Efficiency
US$25M - US$200M
Other expenses Salaries X-Efficiency
US$5M - US$25M
Other expenses Salaries X-Efficiency
US$1M - US$5M
Other expenses Salaries X-Efficiency
Table VII: Integration and control of Expense Preference
< US$1M
Other expenses Salaries X-Efficiency
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Tab VIII
AH N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Low 24 11,31% 11,40% 14,03% 12,17% 93,56% 3,42% 189 5,87% 6,03% 4,39% 5,33% 91,19% 3,64%
Medium 1 553 12,03% 12,13% 3,93% 6,95% 90,83% 4,34%
High 12 559 1,05% 1,09% 2,46% 1,22% 90,98% 2,80% 22 947 1,38% 1,86% 2,79% 1,90% 90,89% 1,93%
AH N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Low 106 12,21% 10,27% 9,17% 8,65% 91,18% 2,94% 509 6,87% 6,03% 6,79% 5,33% 89,57% 3,92%
Medium 60 2,66% 1,43% 5,62% 2,37% 92,43% 2,00% 2 205 14,03% 13,45% 3,57% 5,69% 90,97% 3,53%
High 7 033 1,24% 0,94% 2,39% 0,97% 90,94% 3,23% 34 919 1,47% 2,06% 3,06% 2,19% 90,97% 2,03%
AH N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev N Alfa F Alfa F Alfa F
Low 24 -5,45% -5,37% -9,65% -6,84% -2,37% 0,22% 352 5,87% 0,00% 4,39% 0,00% 86,33% 62,15%
Medium
High 12 559 0,32% 0,77% 0,32% 0,68% -0,09% -0,87% 33 367 1,38% 0,00% 2,79% 0,00% 82,20% 0,00%
AH N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev N Alfa F Alfa F Alfa F
Low 106 -5,34% -4,24% -2,38% -3,32% 1,61% -0,98% 352 5,27% 0,00% 21,63% 0,00% 80,38% 0,00%
Medium 60 11,37% 12,02% -2,06% 3,32% 1,46% -1,53% 3 026 0,00% 0,00% 84,18% 0,00% 21,74% 0,00%
High 7 033 0,23% 1,12% 0,66% 1,23% -0,03% 1,20% 31 993 4,85% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 55,25% 0,00%
Note: Panel B presents, on the left hand side, the net advantage of SN, defined as the difference between SN figures and non-SN, while the right hand side of Panel B presents 
the statistical significance of difference of means and variances, with a T-test of difference of means and a F-test of difference of variances, defined in Table V.   
1999-2001
Net advantage of SN Significance of difference of means and variances
Other expenses Salaries Efficiency Other expenses Salaries Efficiency
Net advantage of SN Significance of difference of means and variances
Other expenses Salaries Efficiency Other expenses Salaries Efficiency
Salaries Efficiency
Panel B: Differences between strategic and non strategic networks
1996-1998
Other expenses Salaries Efficiency Other expenses
Salaries Efficiency
1999-2001
SN non-SN
Other expenses Salaries Efficiency Other expenses
Table VIII: Strategic networks, when should we switch?
Panel A: Efficiency ratios for SN and non-SN networks
1996-1998
SN non-SN
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